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Despite the freedoms each Central Asian state announced following their respective
declarations of independence in 1991, numerous legislative revisions have led to the
restriction of religious freedom in the 1990s and the 2000s. Tighter legislation and pres-
sure against religion stems from the desire of Central Asian authorities to channel the risks
that the “revival” of faith may pose. Although for the ruling regimes, the changes set forth
in religious matters were and remain a means of giving credence to a “new era” in favor of
the independent states; the management of religion is seen as one of the essential
elements necessary to maintain the standards and rules that prevailed under the previous
regime, revealing the difﬁculty to think of the relationship between state and religion in
a different conceptual framework. In order to highlight the paradoxes of the Central Asian
states’ fear of religion, this article focuses on Christian movements, which have to deal
both with a Muslim majority and with secular states afraid of the potential for competition
coming from religion.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Independence confronted the “new” Central Asian taking a very distinct authoritarian turn and alleging that it
governments with many problems, as they were forced to
copewith elements, such as religion, that the Soviet regime
had endeavored, vainly, to keep in the background. Each
government made every effort to promote the idea of deep
changes in these areas and opted for a religious “renewal”
and the idea of a “revival” of national traditions. Never-
theless, under the inﬂuence of the Soviet regime from
which they originated, the political authorities quickly
perceived religion, speciﬁcally Islam, as a potential ideo-
logical competitor. The governments answered this
potential threat as early as the second half of the 1990s,Research Center, HanyangUniverswas their duty to cope with the would-be threat of social
destabilization for which the extremist religious groups
would mainly be responsible. Obstacles to the newfound
freedom of religion thus rapidly emerged in the second half
of the 1990s and these restrictive trends were conﬁrmed
during the following decade. The authorities have used the
sensitive issue of religious extremism as a means to justify
the toughening of legislation on religion (Peyrouse, 2007).
Therefore, twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, it
is questionable whether independence has lead to a reli-
gious “renaissance”, as local governments like to proclaim.
Despite a number of undeniable changes, the Central Asian
states continue to think religion in old terms. Moreover, the
redeﬁnition of faith in Central Asian societies is not new or
speciﬁc, but rather part of much broader global patterns of
secularization. Christian churches have had a presence in
the region since the 19th century. In order to highlight the
paradoxes of the Central Asian states’ fear of religion, thisity. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved. Peer reviewunder
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both with a Muslim majority and with secular states afraid
of the potential for competition coming from religion.11. The legal and political framework of religion in
Central Asia
1.1. Tougher Legislation on Religious Issues
Despite the freedoms each Central Asian state
announced following their respective declarations of inde-
pendence in1991, numerous legislative revisions have led to
the restriction of religious freedom. Although signiﬁcant
differences persist between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, on
one hand, and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, on the other,
all governments have become increasingly strict on reli-
gious matters. Each Central Asian state has sought to put
religious institutions into a legal framework bymaintaining
or restoring structures of control that were created under
the Soviet system such as the Council for Religious Affairs
and theMuslimSpiritual Board.While nominally promoting
dialogue between religion, political authorities, and society,
these institutions are still largely supervised by the state,
a situation thatputs intoquestion theprincipleof separation
of stateandreligion,which ismentioned in theCentralAsian
constitutions. This administrative supervision is indeed
aimed at maintaining pressure on all religious communities
and at controlling their activities through registration
procedures, limitation of theological discourses, and
restrictions on the distribution of religious books, teaching,
and charitable activity.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan initiated these changes in
the 1990s. In Turkmenistan, the liberal legislation adopted
under perestroika has been tightened since 1995, some-
thing that also occurred in Uzbekistan in 1998. In both
states, Christian communities have experienced great
difﬁculties in obtaining registration at the justice minis-
tries. The restrictions placed on religious education are
extreme; strictly controlled and to this day, almost
impossible in practice, it is increasingly often dispensed at
home, as it was in the Soviet period. In addition, there is
almost no religious literature. In Turkmenistan, some shops
in recognized Orthodox churches sell mainly icons and
ritual objects, but Bibles and other religious texts are hard
to ﬁnd. Upon entry into the country, the police generally
conﬁscate foreign religious literature. Members of Christian
congregations encounter difﬁculties leaving the country to
attend their own movement’s congresses. The systematic
control of all forms of expression and communication, such
as the Internet, further impedes all relations with other
countries. In these two states, people of Turkmen or Uzbek
origin who convert to Protestantism immediately expose
themselves to severe pressure from their surroundings and
the political authorities, in particular in the Uzbek regions
of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm.21 For a history of Christians in Central Asia, see Peyrouse (2003).
2 See the Forum 18 web site for more details, www.forum18.org
(accessed August 30, 2009).The three other states tightened their laws in the 2000s,
although amendments to existing legal texts are much
older. In Kazakhstan, religion in general and Christianity in
particular enjoys broad freedoms, a situation that is helped
by the presence of a large minority of Christians (about 40
percent of the population can be considered as Christian by
tradition). However, several projects to revise legislation
have been drafted since the second half of the 1990s. In
2005, amendments to religious legislation, ofﬁcially aimed
at assuring “national security,” limited the room that
Protestant movements have to operate. New bills, pre-
sented in 2008, were set to even further restrict the
possibilities open to the non-Orthodox Christian groups
and to non-registered Muslim communities. However, the
Constitutional Council declared the law, which the parlia-
ment had passed, unconstitutional. In Kyrgyzstan, which
has a true diversity of Christian movements, including
Protestants, new legislation was set in 2009 to reduce the
freedom they had enjoyed to date. In particular, this new
law requires religious communities to have at least 200
members in order to register, which means, as in Uzbeki-
stan, that the many communities having only a few dozen
followers, especially those outside of Bishkek, could be
eliminated. Some Protestant parishes have had hefty taxes
imposed upon them, been threatened with closure, and
had their members physically attacked. In Tajikistan, a new
law effective from April 2009 severely restricts religious
freedom, especially among Muslims. The new law in
essence limits the number of mosques in each neighbor-
hood, based on the number of inhabitants, and for all reli-
gions, increases censorship and restricts worship to places
authorized in advance by administrative authorities. The
already difﬁcult situation for minority Christian move-
ments may therefore worsen.
1.2. Various Modes of Administrative Pressure
The registration formalities for Christian communities
have become again, as during Soviet times, one of the
primary tools of state pressure. Registration has been
refused when groups could not fulﬁll the requirements,
a situation that applied to most in Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. The legislative framework was quickly
exceeded, especially in other republics, where the law did
not prove sufﬁcient in putting an end to movements
considered dangerous; some communities were not regis-
tered even though they had met all necessary require-
ments. A special effort has been made against the
movements considered foreign, accused of proselytism:
especially Presbyterian churches, charismatic groups, and
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Some groups have even been denied
registration because their leader was foreign.3
As under the Soviet regime, another form of pressure is
to revoke the registration of communities deemed too
powerful. Recent years have been punctuated by numerous
church closures. Almost all religions have become illegal in
Turkmenistan. There most Protestant denominations have
witnessed the closure of their houses of worship, from3 Keston News Service – Summary, March 2001.
S. Peyrouse / Journal of Eurasian Studies 1 (2010) 134–143136Baptists and Pentecostals to Jehovah’s Witnesses.4 This also
usually involves the conﬁscation of all objects of worship
and property inside.5 The Seventh Day Adventists in Ash-
gabat meanwhile experienced the outright destruction, by
bulldozer, of their place of worship in November 1999
(Blagovestnik, 1999; Glaube in der Zweiten Welt, 2001). Two
Krishna temples were razed in Mary and in Ashgabat.
A symbol of proselyte dynamism, the publication and
distribution of books is particularly suspect in the eyes of the
political andreligiousauthorities.Although legislation in this
area has been widely reviewed, it is also informally circum-
ventedwhen somemovements succeed, despite the laws, to
produce or use large quantities of literature. In Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, only works in Russian can pass the
censorshipof theCouncils.Religious literature, availableonly
inbuildings ofworship, is extremely limited. TheCouncils for
ReligiousAffairs also limit thenumber of books that religious
movements are allowed to import, particularly targeting the
so-called confessions “of foreign origin,” which are able to
display many and expensive books, magazines, and videos.
All importsare largelydiscouragedbyheavy taxes. Thepolice
do not hesitate to make their seizures in homes or places of
worship, even registered ones.
With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, the political author-
ities exert tight control over media, allowing only limited
religious expression. All Christian denominations, with the
sole exception of the Orthodox Church, have now given up
attempts at having a media presence. The ban on providing
religious education within public education, and even in
private schools in some states, applies primarily to Islam
but also, in practice, to Christian denominations. The ﬁght
against certain “suspicious” movements has gained new
strength in the educational milieu: several reports indicate
pressures teachers exert against students who attend
Presbyterian churches in Almaty (Fagan, 2001). In Uzbeki-
stan, this prohibition is broader. The authorities have ban-
ned all religious movements from teaching minors in any
form or setting, neither in schools nor within their own
churches. The measures against any link between churches
and educational institutions took shape with a decree
passed in 2001. It applied to primary and secondary
schools, universities, as well as all vocational institutions
and after-school recreation, like conservatories, which can
no longer host religious music concerts.6
Beyond bans affecting the institutions themselves,
pressure is very regularly applied to the believers, clergy, or
lay leaders of communities. They include psychological in
addition to physical intrusions,7 police interruption during
worship, interrogation, ﬁnes, and imprisonment. Such
measures arenowapplied inall states, includingKazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan. As they do not have a large body of legis-
lation against religious movements, these latter states
practice more illegal pressure, which is therefore more4 Interviews with Adventist and Baptist pastors, Ashgabat, June 1999.
5 Keston News Service – Summary, February-March 2001.
6 Keston News Service – Summary, March 2001.
7 These threats were reported to us many times, especially against
Protestant preachers and believers. The greatest pressures were in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The other republics, however, were not
exempt of them.difﬁcult for believers and international organizations to
monitor. Deportation is sometimes the ultimate way to get
rid of troublesome religious activists. It is also increasingly
hard for a religious movement to organize charity work
outside the conﬁnes of his church, especially in hospitals
and schools. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Orthodoxy
and Islam now enjoy exclusive privilege to these activities.
If in the 1990s, two categories of states emerged in
Central Asia in terms of religious legislationdUzbekistan
and Turkmenistan, where religious prohibitions were ofﬁ-
cial, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, where
repressive laws existed to a lesser degreedthese differ-
ences have largely dwindled following the revisions to the
Kyrgyz and Tajik laws in 2009. In Kazakhstan, the absence
of strict legislation against religious movements does not
eliminate informal action by the local administration. In
practical terms, methods of repression are common to all
Central Asian states, although their intensity of application
remains diverse.
1.3. The Debate over “non-traditional” Movements
Generally, the measures taken against religion do not
represent the voluntary discrimination of Christianity in
favor of the majority religion, Islam. To the contrary, they are
generally more directed against Islam than Christianity,
which in Central Asia does not have any politicized trends.8
Government authorities try to control the evolution of reli-
gion inorder to avoid thepoliticizationof Islam,whichwould
challenge the states’ structures, borders, and possibly lead to
the overthrowof the current elites, who have enjoyed power
since the 1970s and 1980s. The past ﬁfteen years have thus
been marked by a true offensive against so-called
“Wahhabite” Islam, a derogatory term used to condemn all
politicized forms of the faith as well as every Muslim who
refused, particularly in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, to be
subjected to the strict rules imposed by the political
authorities.9
Themeasures taken by the governments aim to limit the
growth and activities of so-called “non-traditional” Chris-
tian groups that often qualify as “sects.” Central Asian
authorities maintain the classiﬁcation of religions as
perpetuated under the Soviet regime. They have progres-
sively “partitioned” many religious tendencies. On one side
are those currents considered legitimate and on the other,
those perceived as dangerous, whose activities should be
limited or existence even prohibited on the national terri-
tory. One of the most direct means to qualify (or disqualify)
a Christian movement is the binary division between
“churches” and “sects,”which has long beenpracticed in the
West. This separation is so simple as to render it very easily
understood by the public: religion is associated with good
or, for non-believers, as less of a nuisance, whereas sects8 The most politicized movement is in fact the Orthodox Church, which
maintains a long tradition of cooperation with the political authorities. To
the contrary, it has refused to support Russian nationalist actions like the
one for example sought by the Cossacks in Kazakhstan. See Laruelle and
Peyrouse (2004)
9 On Islamism in Central Asia, see among others: Rotar (2002);
Naumkin (2005).
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classiﬁcation is basedon thedesigns of the ruling circles that
deﬁne the religious landscape, and is, ultimately, entirely
open to subjective interpretationby thepolitical authorities.
No reference is made to any sociological studies that
would provide a scientiﬁc basis, or at least a minimal
deﬁnition, for this binary division.10 The advisors on reli-
gion supporting the authorities are generally members of
the Councils of Religious Affairs or representatives of ofﬁ-
cial faiths. The few sociologists from the Soviet era
specializing on religion in Central Asia must comply with
ofﬁcial views or are not listened to when they stray too far
from the ofﬁcial line.11 “Traditional religion” is the one that
belongs to the titular population or to one of the major
national minorities present in the country (the Orthodox
Church for Russians and Armenians, the Lutheran Church
for Germans, and the Catholic Church for other Germans
and Poles), whereas “sects” would be foreign, would
threaten social stability and challenge the independence of
the state. This classiﬁcation allows authorities to margin-
alize any community who seeks to extirpate itself from the
imposed structure of rule. Certain movements, present
since the Czarist regime, such as Baptists and Adventists,
are tolerated to varying degrees in each state. To the
contrary, those aided by foreign missionaries and the ones
that have appeared since the beginning of perestroika are
classiﬁed as foreignmovements and can be subject to harsh
persecution. This doctrinal apprehension of the religious
spectrum is not exclusive to the republics of Central Asia,
but applies to all the states in the CIS, each one executing it
in at least some restrictive way.
This classiﬁcation is pushed to its extreme in
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where Uzbek or Turkmen
believers must be Muslim, while people of “European
origin” are regarded as Orthodox. It is found in other
republics, but to a lesser extent. A number of Christian
movements deemed to be “non-traditional” or “sects” still
appeared, despite challenges from Islam and the Orthodox
Church. The Baptists and Adventists are well known, and
often classiﬁed as traditional movements. The authorities
have gradually taken the habit of distinguishing between
“former sects” and “new sects.” The elements of novelty,
foreignness, and proselytismdthe three linked in a vast
majority of casesdare the ultimate disqualifying factors.
Movements within the sectarian group are rejected not
because of their religious precepts, but because they
possibly convey ideas harmful to the unity of citizens or
opposed to the state.
This distinction also allows the political authorities to
project a modicum of tolerance, as they argue that religious
diversity exists on their territory. It discredits all foreign
missions and the “new” movements, while leaving the10 Based minimally on the classic work of Troeltsch and Weber, as well
as new sociological studies, even though no deﬁnitive consensus
currently exists on these terms.
11 Examples especially include the Kazakh sociologist Ya. F. Troﬁmov,
who, to our knowledge, is the only one criticizing the division between
church and sect. See, in particular, one of his works, Gosudarstvenno-
tserkovnye otnosheniia v sovremennom Kazakhstane, 1997. However, he
condemns the arrival of “new religious movements” from overseas.right of existence of other “sects” already present under
Czarist or Soviet rule. This perception embodies the
contradiction between valuing what is new or modern in
the society, while preferring “tradition” in the religious
context. The so-called “historical religions” are in fact put
forward as an important element of the ethics andmorality
of citizens, itself an implicit understanding of the religion
deﬁned as which links society to the past (Champion &
Cohen, 1999). As such, and as in the West, “new religious
movements”12 arouse suspicion by being too exotic and
unexplored, and religious innovations being “perpetually
the sanctuary of social conﬂict.”(Desroche, 1974) Political
intentions are often attributed to them. This trend is
common and includes the most liberal republic,
Kazakhstan. The great forums dedicated to the dialogue
between religions, organized by the Kazakh president
Nursultan Nazarbayev in 2003 and 2006, have taken place
with the participation of neither the proselyte movements
nor of the Muslim groups not recognized by the Spiritual
Boards. This much-vaunted diversity is in reality limited to
two principal partners, Islam and Orthodoxy, with the
symbolic participation of certain privileged confessions
(Catholicism) and religions (Judaism and Buddhism).
The Central Asian authorities have therefore established
a large, compact group they call “sect,”which is not deﬁned
by actual differences between the movements. As during
Soviet times, the “evils” of each accumulate and create
a broad movement from which all dangers emanate. The
classiﬁcation of religious movements is therefore ambig-
uous and often contradictory. The characteristic of “danger”
differs from the criteria used by European sociologists.
Although the lattermore or less agree onwhat could ﬁt into
the category of “sect”dmovements that oppose society,
refuse any collaboration with the state, and could put the
life of their believers in dangerdthese criteria quickly ﬁnd
their limits in Central Asia. No Christian movement is
aligned with political struggle, nor do they mandate its
members to completelywithdrawal from social life. Most of
them accept the law and state structure, including the
strictest, which until recently had been included in the
“sect” category even in Europe, like Jehovah’s Witnesses.
They generally accept the obligations imposed by society,
even if they only participate in aminimumof its activities.13
Thus all those that refuse to stop proselytizing, have
leadership abroad, or are supported by Western move-
ments qualify as “sects.” In the eyes of the political
authorities, the missionary raises discord within the pop-
ulation and leads to ethnic unrest through the conversion
of Muslims. The government then argues a threat to the
integrity of the country. In Kyrgyzstan some analysts
regularly announce the geographical partition of the
republic between a “Christian” north and a “Muslim” south
(Chekirov, 1995). Fear is less directed toward Christian
movements who could potentially be against the govern-
ment than to proselytes. This is particularly illustrated by12 On the idea of “new religious movements,” see, Introvigne, 1999.
13 On the evolution of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and their progression
towards the criteria deﬁning classic denominations, see Dericquebourg,
1997.
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while the unregistered Baptist church, which resulted from
Soviet era dissidents, continues to reject any interference
from the authorities in its affairs. This denomination has
converted few and its activities, conﬁned to the parish, do
not worry the political authorities, which allow them to
informally practice their faith.
2. Religion in post-Soviet Central Asia: new context,
new role?
Tighter legislation and pressure against religion stems
from the desire of Central Asian authorities to channel the
risks that the “revival” of faith may pose. However, given
the many political upheavals, and social and economic
challenges created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is
questionable whether one should perceive in the region
a religious revival that assumes a break from the Soviet
regime or rather understand a shift towards new religious
norms that are common to secular societies. One must also
ask whether religion in Central Asia feeds from speciﬁc
sources related to the recent Soviet experience, or from
a more distant past.15 For ideas on the persistence of religion in modern societies, refer to
the work of Patrick Michel and Danielle Hervieu-Léger, on which we
extensively rely in this study.
16 This seems to be shown by a superﬁcial analysis of certain social2.1. Secularization, a Global Phenomenon
Religious practice in Soviet times was coupled with
a countermovementof secularism, encouragedby the atheist
regime, but alsovisible in all societies. The reasons for this are
manifold: economic modernization and its corollaries, such
as urbanization and geographic mobility, weaken family and
traditional social ties, give rise to new forms of more ﬂexible
networks linking individuals, rather than groups, and to
individual claims, and ﬁnally allow criticism of previous
generations in the name of linear progress.
Despite all the nuances discernible between Central
Asian states, the region experienced economic and social
modernization that began under Czarist colonialism and
continued during Soviet times. Although there were some
attempts at internal reforms in the late 19th century,
particularly those driven by the jadid movement, this
modernization came from outside, a corollary to the loss of
political independence and entry into the Russian sphere of
inﬂuence. As in many countries outside Europe, colonized
or not, the issue of modernization is also one of indepen-
dence.14 Thus in Central Asia, “modernity” has been
perceived as the realm of the colonizers, rather than an
indigenous phenomenon. But even if these societal changes
came from the “colonizers”, Central Asia is no longer
a “traditional” society, since the Russian-Soviet variety of
European modernity changed its social fabric and accep-
tance of politics.
Modernization induces changes in religious practice.
These are not synonymous with the abandonment of reli-
gion, but rather indicate a shift in practices and approaches.
Again, this phenomenon is by no means speciﬁc to the14 The issue of the endogenous or exogenous nature of the powers in
Central Asia is fundamental, although never publically evoked. On this
idea, in the larger context of decolonized countries, see Badie (1992).Soviet regime, but instead falls within the framework of
a development common to all societies. Religion and its
componentsdbeliefs, practices, requirements, and pro-
hibitionsdremain in effect perceptible everywhere, with
different degrees of intensity.15 This raises the question of
an ideal-typical deﬁnition of “modern” and “traditional”
societies, as well as the relevance of this taxonomy in an
attempt to rank countries in their conception of the reli-
gious phenomenon. The societies referred to as modern are
supposed to be driven by economic rationality, science, and
the idea of progress, which undermines the old supremacy
of religious discourse. The individual must then search for
meaning in his life and see himself acting with a certain
autonomy. In so-called traditional societies, religion instead
maintains a legitimating or explanatory role in many ﬁelds
of social life. These are not “partitioned,” but intrinsically
dependent on each other. The individual takes his place
from birth in a set of social relations that gives him
meaning and does not build from scratch his role in society.
What then is the place of Central Asia in this classiﬁ-
cation? As a former colonial land turned speciﬁc zone of
development within the Soviet Union, does Central Asia
ﬁt into the prescribed category of a traditional or modern
society? Should we differentiate between degrees of
“modernity” among republics and among indigenous and
immigrant populations? In the economic-social realm, the
titular population has generally pursued prerogatives in
agriculture and in the organization of local social struc-
tures, while the European “colonial” population was much
more engaged in the secondary and tertiary sectors,
which were considered more modern. Would these
characteristics have led the region to lesser secularization,
which separates it from the West and the other republics
of the Soviet Union, making it a so-called traditional
society?16
It is necessary to recognize the impossibility of classi-
fying countries into one of these ideal-typical categories
and accept the limitations of systematic mapping on
subjectivematters such asmodernity and tradition. As with
other societies, the Central Asian ones are situated some-
where between the so-called traditional and modern ideal-
types. In this sense, the Central Asian states do not differ in
nature from the rest of the former Soviet Union and the
West. They combine societal elements and narratives that
are divergent and even contradictory in their interests, and
do not actually have the standardization wished by the
political powers; their diversity is precisely an element of
modernity. There is thus no question of asserting an
absolute speciﬁcity of Central Asia. Despite its own Soviet
experience, the phenomenon of secularization to which it
is subject remains common to all contemporary societies.characteristics, like the mahallas system in Uzbekistan, the maintenance
of the tradition of bride purchase, social networks, etc. These traits are
not “original” but reveal the adaptation of Central Asian societies to the
Soviet regime and combine “modern” elements like demographic
transition.
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continuity over change?
The debate is less about the inclusion of Central Asia in
either the “modern” or “traditional” category, than
assessing the place of religion at the end of the Soviet
regime. The Soviet experience played an important role in
the modernization process, including the will to build
a new man, the destruction of certain aspects of tradi-
tional society, and divestiture from old institutions of
power. Soviet policy was, from its beginnings, paradoxi-
cally dual, separating areas of society that were hitherto
intertwined, but at the same time, attempting to reinte-
grate them immediately into a new context. As in Europe,
religion lost some of its power but unlike in European
states, this exclusion was thought to be total. The religious
phenomenon was therefore redeployed in the Soviet
Union in ways that are not necessarily similar to those of
the West.
Competition from a strong ideology, seen as a secular
religion,17 differentiates the two spaces. However, the goal
reached did not match the expectations of the Soviet
powers; the ideological monopoly that sought to foil all
religious thought made religion one of the most accessible
counterweights. Although the context and terms of the
redeployment of religion are signiﬁcantly different
between Western societies and post-Communist societies,
a common observation can be drawn. In the West, the
partial expulsion of religion resulted from a process of
“detotalization” of the human experience, thanks to the
growing differentiation of institutions, whereas on the
Soviet side, the expulsion of religion was proclaimed in the
name of another competing totality, the Communist
ideology, which led to the immediate redeployment of
religion as a space of freedom. Its “revival” since the
collapse of the Soviet Union cannot therefore be seen as the
corollary of an impulse toward individual faith but as
a resurgence of religious institutions and practices.
The phenomenon of conversion, undeniably demon-
strated by ﬁgures since perestroika, also remains to be
qualiﬁed. Entry into the Orthodox Church was what priests
called a fad, and was focused in few years, particularly
between 1988 and 1992. The ﬁery conversions to Protestant
movements generated a lot of talk among local observers
hitherto unaccustomed to such interpretations of faith, but
Protestants nevertheless remained very much a minority
within the religious population. Finally, many people
entered movements having not had a revelation, but
aspiring to ﬁt into a structure of belief. It was an encounter
with a missionary or a religious structure, made possible by
new legislation, which led them into the ranks of
a community, rather than the sudden conviction of the
need for religious practice.
Modernity does not exclude religion from society,
contrary to the hopes of the Bolsheviks, who believed that
industrialization and urbanizationwould lead inexorably to
atheism. This idea was also present in Western societies,
where falling participation in institutionalized faiths was17 On Communism as a religion see, Besançon (1977)apprehended as a sign of the end of Christianity and the
death of religious beliefs in their entirety. The Soviet
experience was indeed one of possible versions of
modernization of European societies. Its militant atheism
did not change the nature of faith, but gave it some traits
not present in theWest. The post-Soviet period cannot then
be regarded as a revival of belief; there was no break in the
religious sense, but changes in its public expression.
2.3. Societies orphaned from the centrality?
The place of religion in post-Soviet Central Asia is not
new in that it is pursuing a phenomenon of secularization
common to both Western countries and the Soviet Union.
Can one talk of a rupture in the relation to the state,
understood as an ideological center, since 1991? The
splitting of the Soviet geographical space into ﬁfteen
independent republics can be seen as a rupture, not only in
shaping government policies that no longer reference the
preceding ideology, but also by a gradual removal of
political and economic relations between the republics. The
disappearance of the Soviet Unionwas accompanied by the
loss of a central distributor of wealth, especially in the
republics of Central Asia, whose economic balance was
often largely in deﬁcit. Declining standards of living, the
collapse of industries, widening social inequalities, and the
other difﬁculties that arose in each state, according to
various intensities, contributed to this feeling of loss of
centrality. Whole segments of society found themselves
orphaned from a center to which they had assimilated,
confusing ideology and pragmatism. Many former Soviet
citizens developed a nostalgic memory toward the Brezh-
nev era as a sort of “golden age”: the global magnitude of
the Soviet superpower, a large space of inﬂuence (the entire
Socialist bloc), a standard of living judged superior to
present ones, and free social services are widely missed.
After 1991, the post-Soviet societies faced political leader-
ship that presented itself as new. Each state has, according
to its terms, promoted “democracy” and measured market
economy, trying to make independence an alternative
ideology to compensate for the worldview that had been in
force for over seven decades. Despite the development of
a new vocabulary of independence, the end of the Soviet
regime was perceived as a “vacuum” for citizens who did
not expect the disappearance of the whole system. The loss
of ideological centrality was then coupled with a loss of
familiar political, social, and economic landmarks and
a strong sense of narrowing of the referent space, with the
transformation of Soviet administrative borders into
increasingly impermeable boundaries between interna-
tionally recognized states. This feeling of loss needs to be
nuanced, as the impression of a sudden break in 1991, in
reality, has its origins in the more distant past. The collapse
of the regime is not the starting point of the disappearance
of ideological centrality. Since de-Stalinization, the
Communist Party had lost some of its centralizing role and
had to make compromises with autonomous societal
elements, like religion. The progress towards a totalitarian
objective was difﬁcult and led to inevitable erosion, when
the Communist ideal was gradually replaced by more
pragmatic concerns. For many, however, independence is
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of relativity had not been sufﬁciently familiar to enable
them to prepare for it.
The fall of the regime can then be seen not as a point of
departure or arrival, but as the mere removal of the label
“Communist” attached to the authorities, one step in a long
process that goes far beyond some of the new conditions
imposed by independence (Michel,1994). The real debate is
less about the validity of Communism as a whole, than on
the centrality issue, which proved to be a relevant question
even outside Communist societies. The challenge therefore
goes beyond the single Soviet case to affect all so-called
modern societies. All are considered as orphans from some
center, even if this process began in a more distant past
than the Soviet experience.18 The loss of the centrality, an
element inherent in modernity, is a process spread over
time and not the consequence of a sudden event. To some
observers, religion would develop in former Socialist
countries as compensation for the loss of centrality and to
ﬁll an ideological “void.” Citizens, having lost overnight all
their points of reference, would seek to be embraced in the
arms of religion. Although the break between the center
and the periphery was very effective in economic and
political terms, this was less the case at the ideological
level, since the Soviet centrality had been undermined
much earlier and the new authorities are pursuing
a paternalistic vision of themselves. It is therefore difﬁcult
to frame the development of religious movements, both in
Russia and in Central Asia, as a renewal resulting from the
breakup of the Soviet Union. However, this does not mean
that one should ignore the consequences of independence
in shaping the religious consciousness of Central Asians.
3. Why do Central Asian governments fear religious
movements?
3.1. The quest for the totality of the church based on the
rejection of politics
In the new political context, the church has tried to
recover a role for totalization by releasing a comprehensive
moral framework, as it was shown by all the references in
Christian hierarchies to a form of anti-modernization
expressed in local periodicals or during sermons from
ofﬁces. This urge to re-totalize is not only the realm of the
Orthodox Church. Although Orthodoxy presents itself as
a “national” religion in many republics of former Soviet
Union, the Catholic Church is also engaged, despite many
nuances, in this direction, especially in countries where it is
a dominant majority, as in Poland. Finally, this push for the
re-totalization of the world is also visible in other religions,
such as Islam. The drift of some Muslim groups toward
a political Islam where the state would be subordinate to
religion constitutes a speciﬁc version of it (Roy, 1992).
The Church’s quest for totality is based on the rejection
of politics. This sense of competition is particularly strong
in Central Asia in that certain continuity with the previous18 On modernity and the difﬁculty in placing its beginning in time, see
Hervieu-Léger (1993, 1999)regime appears. In both cases, Soviet and post-Soviet,
strong regimes and leaders seek to reassure the individual
in a transition period and provide a comprehensive Welt-
anschauung under the pretext of a better future. Religion
becomes a vehicle for protest and attempts to exclude
politics by questioning its legitimacy to be normative. It
does not condemn the right of the political authorities to
manage society on a daily basis,19 but denies it any ability to
declare what is right, moral, or good. Whether it is the
Soviet or independent authorities, all are condemned for
their willingness to prescribe human values.
The Central Asian states are all the more the target of
criticism by the churches since they have asserted them-
selves to be secular and when religious elements do come
into play, Islam rather than Christianity is favored. Pro-
testing this totality, the church feels it must exceed the
state and afﬁrm its own totality. The Church is, however,
also subject to the disillusionment and cannot come up
with a total religious system to manage all elements of
society. Thus, “the ﬁction of the centrality of consciousness
has been replaced by a necessarily ﬁctional nature of any
centrality”(Michel, 1994, p. 156). The religious institution
indeed wants to produce such a standard, but this is
increasingly rejected by a large proportion of the pop-
ulation, reﬂected in the distance taken with respect to
religious institutions and practices, even in Central Asia.
The absolute embodied by the Christian movements is
conﬂicting with the relative perceived in the societies and
the idea that, after the failure of totalizing systems, nothing
now holds a monopoly on truth. For the churches, to admit
the crisis of the monopoly on truth, however, would be
a challenge to their founding principle.
The tension between politics and religion appears when
the latter attempts to reinvest a former social role and
competes with the state as a vehicle of utopia. Religion
revisits the past and the future by magnifying them to feed
the complex and rejected present. The past is easier to
reshape because the post-Soviet states are themselves in
a phase of intense discursive reconstruction of their national
past.Newreligiousmovements and the “marginal”groups, as
major challenges to the large religious institutions, draw on
this utopianism more than historical churches do, as the
latter already have an established theological framework.
This is the case with the Jehovah’s Witnesses, which in their
brochures promise a better future imaged by naive drawings.
Sothat the reinventionofautopia ispossible, it isnecessary to
loosen the “authorized memory”, (Hervieu-Léger, 1993, p.
211) a process that is easier in what have been deﬁned as
“illicit religions” (Desroche, 1974). However, the utopia
spread by some religious movements remains conﬁned to
averynarrownumberof individuals. The elitismthat feedsor
fed many limited movements via this principle often led to
their gradual disappearance in Central Asia. Thiswas the case
for most schismatic Orthodox movements, with the excep-
tion of the community of Old Believers in Ust-Kamenogorsk,
who survived precisely through their openness and19 With the exception of movements having the characteristics of
“sects,” in that they oppose all state institutions, but this is extremely rare
in Central Asia.
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a sense of elitism that would separate their members from
the outside world, while recruiting as widely as possible to
give the necessary momentum to the denomination.3.2. Religion as a brake on the “movement”
The condemnation of politics by religious institutions is
also manifested in the reactions of the latter to the
modernization of society, which would be the responsi-
bility of the states. In Western countries, like in the former
Soviet Union, religion can protest against societal elements
that break with norms, and are labeled uncontrolled. In this
case, the believer ﬁnds in the church away of self-assertion
through the communion of values opposed to those shared
by the majority of society. It expresses the hope that the
minority will preserve the character of purity, lost by
a corrupt majority who has given up the traditional
prescribed standards. Religion therefore becomes a vehicle
for re-idealization in the sense that it claims to ﬁll what is
perceived as a void or degradation.
Bridging the “vacuum” means imposing and dissemi-
nating contested moral precepts, entering into open
conﬂict with society and state, but also responding to the
uncertainty inherent in modernity. Religion is then
understood as the only possible way to address the
perverted elements of society.20 This approach is by no
means speciﬁc to Central Asia. It is transnational as well as
trans-denominational, but with very sensitive nuances on
the degree of conservatism among various religious
movements. The Orthodox Church is one of the most active
on this issue. The social doctrine of the Moscow Patri-
archate, published in 2000, warned against the globaliza-
tion of economic, social, and cultural relations, and
denounced the Western-style, secular drift of the former
Soviet Union (Osnovy sotsial’noi kontseptsii russkoi
pravoslavnoi tserkvi, 2000). Central Asian Orthodoxy seeks
to be even more conservative. It criticizes the inability of
religion to reach public schools when violence and
perversion can be shown on television (Rus’ sviataia – kak
edinyi monastyr’. Vozmozhno-li segodnia votserkovlenie
Rossii?, 2000). It condemns Western aid for the develop-
ment of family planning and contraception, and develops
a discourse that can only be described as extreme on the
issue of abortions in cases of rape. It also refuses to
acknowledge of some sciences, such as psychiatry, and
expressed concern when Russia signed a decree recog-
nizing it as a contemporary science.
Here is revealed the full extent of the gap between the
religious institution and its believers. The hierarchy
systematically rejects abortion, while in reality this prac-
tice, as in the West, is largely in the local customs of
European minorities and even Central Asian titular
majorities. Religion hopes to show that the social20 The ofﬁcial newspaper of the Orthodox Eparchy of Tashkent wrote of
the world as “chaos coming in a devlish dance, at a rate that grows every
year, accompanied by the roar of factories and automobiles. It is impos-
sible to stop, we lost the ancient rhythms where on could heard the
sound of the sacred cosmos” (Zelinskii, 1993).consensus is illusory, and will disappear if the aspirations
to refuse the “modernity” dare to make themselves
known. The objective is to form allegiances against social
norms and to root the individual in benchmarks that
society is committed to change, referring speciﬁcally to
“the madness of current comfort” (sovremennoe komfor-
tobesie, Alferov, 1997) advocated by consumer society.
Religion thus becomes an incarnation of normative
otherness; it implies the conscious investment of the
individual within it, playing on the record of account-
ability and guilt of believers, even if the leveling of many
religious currents and their gradual transformation erodes
these feelings. Conﬂict may yet become the leitmotif of
faith. The rise of social consensus, such as an accession to
a mass consumer society despite the criticism of it,
appears to be one of the main threats to the existence of
protest religious sentiment in Central Asia.
Culture has always been important in the confrontation
of religious movements against modernity; it has passed
fromof the rejection of railroads byChristianity and Islam in
the 19th century to the rejection of theater and ﬁlm, or of
television by many Central Asian movements, mainly Prot-
estant but also Orthodox, in the 20th century. In a Jehovah’s
Witness ofﬁce in Almaty, the preacher explained that “to
listen, even accidentally, to the television is to listen and
watch the devil, to watch consciously is to make oneself the
missionary of Satan.”21 The Orthodox Church has shown
great virulence in its critique of television, regularly dedi-
cating long articles to the harmful nature of this diversion,
which would provoke nervous and psychological maladies,
divide families, and legitimize cruelty and aggression.
Finally, the principle of theaterwould be contrary to biblical
precepts (El’chaninov, 1993). Some Baptist or Mennonite
communities also continue to watch with heavy suspicion
these means of cultural expression.
In Central Asia, religion hopes to decide of the agenda of
society. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, many
churches have afﬁrmed the continuity between the athe-
istic regime and post-Soviet society, whose standards are
considered Western and therefore foreign. The Orthodox
Church is striving to counter the evolution of contemporary
Central Asia, criticized as much for being “Western” as for
its indigenization, in the name of protecting local particu-
larities. Ignorance and misunderstanding of the West
sometimes seem total. Numerous journal articles recount
the journeys of Orthodox clergy in the West and their
amazement at a culture of which they do not comprehend
the foundations (“Kak veruiut vo Khrista na Zapade
segodnia. Beseda s protoiereem Valentinom Sazonovym”,
2000). Orthodox discourse rarely conceals its dual
purpose, to make society moral but also to destroy the
“illusion of the West” and to limit emigration.
Orthodoxy sometimes borders on xenophobia in its
opposition to the “Westernization” of Central Asian socie-
ties in denouncing, for example, the so-called eternal Drang
nach Osten, today economic, of Germany (Solomonov,
1997). It updates the Soviet terminology by accusing21 Sermon of a preacher at a religious service, heard in Almaty,
December 1999.
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(“Protestantizm kak religiia agressivnogo burzhua: ekskurs
v istoriiu”, 1997). Even Russia does not set the example for
Central Asian Orthodoxy, the latter being more conserva-
tive than its counterpart. Thus, the Kazakhstani Orthodox
journal Svet pravoslaviia v Kazakhstane does not hesitate to
condemn the sex education program launched in Russian
schools and refuses to have it implemented in Kazakhstan
(“Da ne budet etogo s nami”, 1997). Here emerges one of
the main contradictions of the Orthodox denomination,
which is supposed to highlight the individual through
universal principles, but in reality promotes mainly
nationalist convictions.
4. Conclusion
The concept of religious “revival” is not without chal-
lenges and political overtones. Through it, the Central Asian
states proclaim proudly their respect for democracy and
rediscovered religious freedom. They emphasize the
number of places of worship that are now open, a number
much higher than it was under the Soviet regime, but
refuse to comment on the repressive measures taken
against religious denominations. The ofﬁcial discourse
continues to condemn the ofﬁcial atheism of the previous
regime while “forgetting” the concessions involuntarily
made for several decades to religion. The idea of the loss of
centrality is convenient for the authorities, which present it
as a danger threatening to destabilize society. In order to
avoid the “vacuum” to be ﬁlled by extremism, the Central
Asian authorities have thus eliminated the Soviet centrality
and imposed their own, or rather try to preserve the one
held by Soviet authorities notwithstanding proclaiming
their novelty and condemning the authoritarianism of the
previous regime. This principle appears in all area-
sdpolitical, economic, and socialdand is particularly well
illustrated in the context of education, where the works of
current presidents has sometimes replaced the study of
Marxism-Leninism.
Preserving the idea of centrality presupposes the deﬁ-
nition and identiﬁcation of elements that would put this
unity into danger. Formerly “enemies of the people,” today
“enemies of stability” consist of anything that does not
strictly adhere to the ofﬁcial framework: political parties,
nongovernmental, charitable, and religious organizations,
and individuals who are not docile enough. The Islamist
attacks that have occurred since the late 1990s in Central
Asia have been largely used to reconstruct the concept of
the enemy and develop the conspiracy theories necessary
for states that claim monopoly over public expression.
Presented as the only guarantors of democratic and secular
values, the political authorities have drawn up an outra-
geous schematic in which all forms of uncontrolled or
aspirant independent religiosity is equated to a systemati-
cally fundamentalist political opposition. The religious
conspiracy theories appear as one of the key leitmotifs of
authoritarian powers in Central Asia, especially in
Uzbekistan.
What is questionable here is not the fear aroused by
violent fundamentalist movements, Islamic or otherwise,
but rather the idea of centrality and its relevance. Thepresence of Islamic groups appears to pose less of a real
danger than the arguments made by those in power to
justify their failures, forgetting that the Soviet regime had
also not expected, at its expense, the predictable failure of
a system that too strongly adheres to the utopia of
centrality. In such a context, religion now ﬁnds or retains
the role it never stopped playing under the Soviet regime,
challenging by its mere existence the centrality claimed by
authorities. This is where religion poses a threat to Central
Asian governments, as it can show that “a political totality,
which can only be ﬁctitiously unanimous, is actually
a political nothingness” (Michel, 1994–1995, p. 68). Only
the terms have changed; the new totality no longer
excludes religion but instrumentalizes it for the ends the
authorities desire.
Limiting the autonomy of religion transforms it imme-
diately, in the eyes of part of the population, in an essential
counterweight to the political authorities. An obvious
continuity exists in the most repressive republics, espe-
cially Uzbekistan, where religious prohibitions contribute
unwittingly to the development of Islamic dissident
movements. The persistence of religion to offset politics is
compounded by the fact that the area of autonomy granted
to civil society is often very small, or even nonexistent, as in
Turkmenistan. Religion is not therefore compensation for
the end of the Soviet regime, which was a speciﬁc experi-
ence, but compensation for the phantasms of centrality of
the Central Asian authorities. The latter cannot indeed
recognize that “It was certainly not religion that under-
mined the Communist regimes, but the ‘incredible’ char-
acter of their claims of totality” (Michel, 1994–1995, p. 3).
Although for the ruling regimes, the changes set forth in
religious matters were and remain a means of giving
credence to a “new era” in favor of the independent states;
the management of religion is seen as one of the essential
elements necessary tomaintain the standards and rules that
prevailed under the previous regime, revealing the inability
to think of the relationship between state and religion in
a different conceptual framework. A separation into two
time slotsdSoviet and then independencedseems to
oversimplify a history that the current authorities assume
only with difﬁculty, since they are directly derived from the
previous regime. To share their perspective on the religious
issue would avoid any deeper reﬂection and justify current
policies,which sometimes lead to extremeauthoritarianism
and personiﬁcation of power.References
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